RELIGIOUS FUNDAMENTALISM AND VIOLENCE: IS THERE ANY DIRECT CORRELATION BETWEEN FUNDAMENTALISM AND VIOLENCE? by Mujahiduddin, Mujahiduddin
Mujahiduddin 
144   Jurnal Diskursus Islam 
  Volume 1 Nomor 1, April 2013 
 
RELIGIOUS FUNDAMENTALISM AND VIOLENCE: 
IS THERE ANY DIRECT CORRELATION BETWEEN  
FUNDAMENTALISM AND VIOLENCE? 
 
Mujahiduddin 
Lecture of Philosophy in Ushuluddin Faculty  
at State Islamic University Alauddin  
muja.didink@yahoo.com. 
 
 
 
Abstract: This essay examines the correlation between religious 
fundamentalism and violent acts. The prominent question addressed in this 
paper is about is there any direct correlation between fundamentalism and 
violence?. To answer this inquiry, this writing is going to elaborate three 
points. First, it defines the term fundamentalism and describes its shared 
characteristic features. Secondly, it will describe the meaning and 
categories of violence used in analyzing correlation between religious 
fundamentalism movements and the utilization of violent actions such as 
bombing attacks, assassination, kidnapping etc. Thirdly, this article also 
tries to analyze the links between fundamentalism and violence and how 
these links are understood in the study of „fundamentalist Islam‟ and 
„violent political Islam‟. This essay argues that the presence of religious 
fundamentalism such as radical Islamic group does not always connote to 
violent.  Whether or not a religious fundamentalism group will be 
advocating violent means in its movement is more likely depending on 
some intermediary factors such as state‟s response. 
 
Tuilsan ini membahas tentang hubungan antara fundamentalisme agama 
dan kekerasan. Pertanyaan yang ingin diangkat ialah apakah ada 
hubungan langsung antara fundamentalisme agama dengan kekerasan?. 
Untuk menjawab pertanyaan ini, maka tulisan ini akan mengemukakan 
tiga aspek, yaitu, pertama; mendefinisikan istilah fundamentalism dan 
menjelaskan kerakteristiknya. Kedua, menjelaskan makna dan kategori 
kekerasan yang digunakan sebagai kerangka teoritis dalam menganalisa 
hubungan antara fundamentalisme agama dan kekerasan. Ketiga adalah 
menganalisa hubungan tersebut dan mencoba melihatnya dari perpektif 
gerakan radikal Islam. Tulisan ini mengasumsikan bahwa kehadiran 
gerakan fundamentalisme agama tidak selalu punya kaitan dengan 
kekerasan. Penggunaan kekerasan oleh gerakan fundamentalis sangat 
tergantung dengan fakto eksternal seperti respon Negara. 
 
Keywords: fundamentalism, religious fundamentalism, violence, 
and state 
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I. Introduction 
The presence of Islamic fundamentalism groups has been attracting 
attention from both domestic and international media and academics, mainly 
after 9/11 2001 in the USA and subsequent terrorist attacks in Indonesia. The 
strong allegation was that a number of Islamic fundamentalism movements, 
such as Laskar Jihad and Jemaah Islamiyah, were terrorist organisations, and 
targets in the West‟s „global war on terror‟. Not surprisingly, some scholars 
argued that the al-Qaeda network had spread into Southeast Asia, including 
Indonesia.1 Some argue that the Islamic fundamentalism was brought to 
Indonesia from the Middle East, which accounts for its militancy and violence 
as part of a global threat.2 This assessment of political Islam in Indonesia, 
however, is an over-simplification that ignores the variations in the phenomena 
of transnational Middle Eastern Islamist movements. Not all Islamist 
movements in Indonesia committed violence or terrorism. Gerakan Tarbiyah 
and Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia were two instances of fundamentalist Islamic 
groups that were committed to physical non-violence. In this regard Ayoob 
argues that “most contemporary transnational Islamist activities do not fall 
within the jihadist description”3 and that transnational Islamist movements 
were very numerous, ranging from missionary activity (da'wa) to political 
activity.4 
Based on the above argument, this paper is going to put forward three 
points regarding fundamentalism and violence. First, it defines the term 
fundamentalism and describes its shared characteristic features. This is 
important because it avoids confusion and misunderstanding in the assessment 
of Islamic politics. Secondly, this writing describes the meaning and categories 
of violence used in analyzing correlation between religious fundamentalism 
movements and the utilization of violent actions such as bombing attacks, 
assassination, kidnapping etc. Thirdly, this article also tries to analyze the links 
between fundamentalism and violence and how these links are understood in 
the study of „fundamentalist Islam‟ and „violent political Islam‟.  While the two 
are often taken as synonymous, they are shown to be very distinct components 
of Islamic teaching and practice in Indonesia.   
What the main question will be addressed is about –as mentioned in sub-
title above- is there direct connection between religious fundamentalism and 
violence?. In this paper, I will argue that the phenomenon of religious 
                                                 
1 See for example, RohanGunaratna, Inside Al Qaeda: Global Network of Terror (New York: 
Colombia University Press, 2002); ZachariAbuza, Militant Islam in Southeast Asia: Crucible of 
Terror (Boulder and London: Lynn Rienner Publishers, 2003). 
2 For example, see Greg Fealy and Anthony Bubalo, JejakKafilah: PengaruhRadikalismeTimur 
Tengah di Indonesia (Joining the Caravan? The Middle East Islamism and Indonesia), (Bandung: 
Mizan, 2005). 
3 Mohammed Ayoob, The Many Faces of Political Islam: Religion and Politics in the Muslim World 
(USA]: The University of Michigan Press, 2008), p. 134. 
4Mohammad Ayoob, The Many Faces of Political Islam: Religion and Politics in the Muslim World., p. 
134-35. 
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fundamentalism such as Islamic radical groups does not always cultivate 
violence. There are any intermediary factors which may trigger a religious 
fundamentalism group to be using violence.   
 
II. Definition and Characteristics of Fundamentalism 
Fundamentalism is a very problematic and complex concept. This is 
because, first, the use of this term to denote phenomena of religious movements 
taking place outside evangelical Christianity5 is much debated among scholars. 
Some adopt a strict stance to reject the extension of the term fundamentalism 
beyond the Christian tradition. The reason for this is that fundamentalism is 
said to be inappropriate in explaining the phenomenon of Islamic movements 
for example. Others, however, try to extend the use of the term to non-Christian 
religious movements. It is argued that historically, though religious movements 
exhibit a large number of unique religious teachings and practices, many also 
share a „certain resemblance‟,6 or have many characteristics in common.  
Secondly, as a complex notion, there are major disagreements over how 
to define fundamentalism.   As a result, the term may be used to draw a 
religious movement negatively, such as associating fundamentalism with 
terrorism and violent extremism.7 Alternatively, fundamentalist belief may 
suggest piety and an emphasis on inward looking spiritual engagement with 
the material world. Definitions of fundamentalism expressed by scholars do not 
always cover all of its possible aspects. Therefore, given these difficulties, the 
purpose of the definitions considered in this thesis is more as “a point of 
departure” rather than as a constant or unchanged labeling or depiction of the 
phenomenon.8 
  Jeffery K. Hadden and Anson Shupe define fundamentalism as „the 
proclamation of reclaimed authority over a sacred tradition which is to be 
reinstated as an antidote for a society that has strayed from its traditional 
                                                 
5 During the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, an internal debate in American 
Protestantism known as the Modernist Controversy happened. The controversy is mainly about 
the biblical explanation of creation and the divine status of the Bible. It later led to two trends of 
thinking; modernist or liberals and traditionalist or conservatives. The former argued that 
Christian‟s adherents should necessitate to follow the change by adapting Christian‟s views to 
the development of science and scholarship for example, and while the letter still maintain the 
older tenets of revelation and biblical inerrancy.  
Between 1910 and 1915 some pamphlets that contained with the anti-modernist opinion 
published under the title of The Fundamentals. In further development, those who agreed with 
these pamphlets popularized the „Fundamentals‟ as „a catch-phrase for anti-modernism‟. For 
complete explanation see Michael Barkun, „Religious Violence and the Myth of 
Fundamentalism‟, A Franks Cass Journal, Vol. 4, Number 3, Winter, 2003, pp., 55-70, p. 56.       
6To find the complete explanation, see Gabriele Marranci, Understanding Muslim Identity: 
Rethinking Fundamentalism (UK: Palgrave MacMillan, 2009),   
7 Gabriele Marranci, Understanding Muslim Identity, 2009, p. 10.  
8 Jamhari and JajangJahroni, Gerakan Salafi Radikal di Indonesia (Radical Salafi Movement in 
Indonesia), (Jakarta: PT Raja GrafindoPersada, 2004).  
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cultural values.‟9 They identify three main features. First, it is theological which 
imposes implementation of religious doctrines on the private and public 
spheres. Secondly, there has to be political fundamentalism, by which they 
mean prohibition among followers, often enforced, against worldly vices such 
as secularization and modernization. Thirdly, fundamentalism is cultural, 
differentiating between various religions and the search for the true and 
righteous „dominant religion.‟10 
 Almond et al. define fundamentalism as „ a discernible pattern of 
religious militance by which self-styled true believers attempt to arrest the 
erosion of religious identity, fortify the border of the religious community, and 
create viable alternatives to secular institutions and behaviors‟.11 It can be said 
from this definition that fundamentalists assume that religion is everywhere 
under threat from misleading ideas such as secularism, modernism and 
liberalism. Therefore they call for the religion‟s followers to fortify their own 
religious identity and community against these threats by reviving traditional 
religious values in both the private and public spheres. 
Bruce Lawrence defines fundamentalism as a desire and effort to reclaim 
religious authority. It refers to acts by „earnest folk to retain a place for old-
fashioned values in a rapidly modernizing world.‟12 Thus, there are a number of 
different possible features and types of fundamentalism, namely; 
fundamentalists develop their own technical terminology or use particular 
words to understand the world. They support minority concepts often rejected 
by the majority as heretical, or they reject secularist and „wayward‟ religious 
adherents. Almost in every case fundamentalist movements are ruled by 
charismatic males.13 
Within the context of Islam fundamentalism14, according to Martyn E 
Marty, could be recognised as exhibiting four features. First, fundamentalism is 
„oppositionalism‟. Islamic fundamentalism calls on its adherents to oppose the 
perceived threats or enemy, encompassing modernity, secularization, 
liberalization and western values in general. Secondly, hermeneutics is rejected. 
For Islamic fundamentalists the Qur‟anic text should be understood through 
literal means, or taqlid, the copying or obeying of authoritative interpretations.15 
They disagree with a critical and rational approach to interpreting the Qur‟an, 
                                                 
9 Amirthavenkatraman, „Fundamentalism and Its Stereotypes,‟ in Journal of UDK: 279.124, Biblid 
0025-8555, 58, Vol. LVIII, br. 1-2, 2006, pp. 7-35, p. 9.  
10 Amirthavenkatraman, „Fundamentalism and Its Stereotypes,‟ p. 9.  
11 Michael O. Emerson and David Hartman, „The Rise of Religious Fundamentalism,‟ Annu. Rev. 
Sociol, 2006, 32, pp. 127-44, p. 130.   
12 Amirthavenkatraman, „Fundamentalism and Its Stereotypes,‟ 2006, p. 9 
13 Amirthavenkatraman, „Fundamentalism and Its Stereotypes,‟ 2006, p. 9.  
14 Fundamentalism has been turned into various synonyms such as religious revivalism, 
political   Islam, radical, Islamist,salafi, Wahhabi. Despite the debate on the labeling of the 
phenomenon in academic discourses, in this thesis these terms will be interchangeably used. 
15 Martyn E Marty, “What is Fundamentalism? Theological Perspective”, in Hans Küng and 
Jurgen Moltmann (eds), Fundamentalism as an Ecumenical Challenge (London: SCM Press, 1992), 
p., 3-31 
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or ijtihad, because human reasoning is incapable of determining the Qur‟an‟s 
essential meaning. Thirdly, fundamentalists discard religious pluralism because 
this principle contradicts the Qur‟an‟s values as God‟s final revelation, and 
confuses one‟s faith. Fourthly, fundamentalists reject historical and sociological 
development because it diverts the spiritual concern with abiding by literal 
doctrines and understanding the scripture.16 
In addition, Jamhari and Jajang Jahroni, in their book Gerakan Salafi 
Radikal di Indonesia, identify several specific features of religious „radical-
fundamentalism‟. First, fundamentalists believe that Islamic tenets involve all 
aspects of life ranging from politics and laws, to economics and society. 
Secondly, Western values such as secularism and materialistic must be 
rejected.17 Fundamentalists acknowledge Islam‟s historic failure to establish a 
religious society but blame it on the misguided pursuit of Western values.  
Thirdly, fundamentalists argue that to achieve social and political change, 
Islamic followers should be guided only by Islamic principles contained in the 
Qur‟an and hadith. Fourthly, as a consequence of the rejection of the Western 
ideologies, fundamentalists also reject social-political regulations demanded by 
West as a form of neo-colonialism. The fifth feature is that, although 
fundamentalists are known to be puritanical and anti-Western, they do not 
reject advance technologies.18 In other words, they utilise aspects of modernity 
such as science and modern tools of communication and other technologies.19  
Finally, „Islamisation‟ is more likely to be achieved with a good organisation of 
well educated and ideologically driven followers forming militant groups and 
communities.20 
Taking these views into account, Islamic fundamentalism can be defined 
as a movement in which its followers perceive that religion is under threat from 
the processes of secularisation and modernisation. These processes result in the 
erosion of religious identity. Thus, fundamentalists believe that the only one 
solution is to escape from the unbeneficial conditions of the modern material 
world by pursuing significant social-political change, which is only possible 
with the revival of the religious values and traditions in in the private and 
public spheres.  
Appling traditional religious values as a guide to changing the secular 
material world, fundamentalists believe that the Holy Books (the Torah, Qur‟an, 
and Bible, for example) are guides to all aspects of life as revealed by God. They 
are meant to be comprehended literally and followed without reflection or 
                                                 
16 Martyn E Marty, “What is Fundamentalism? Theological Perspective”, p., 3-31. 
17 Jamhari and JajangJahroni,Gerakan Salafi Radikal di Indonesia (Salafi Radical Movement in 
Indonesia), p., 4  
18 Not surprisingly, any fundamentalism movements utilize Internet and others media to 
disseminate their ideologies or agendas and even using them to strengthen the social basis of 
Islamic society and also to fight back against the West. See Jamhari and 
JajangJahroni,GerakanSalafiRadikal di Indonesia (Salafi Radical Movement in Indonesia), p. 5.   
19 Michael O. Emerson and David Hartman, „The Rise of Religious Fundamentalism, p. 134.  
20 Jamhari and JajangJahroni,Gerakan Salafi Radikal di Indonesia, 2004, p. 5.  
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asking critical questions. In addition, Islamic fundamentalists reject e western 
ideologies despite using modernization as a tool. They have also a strong desire 
to establish an exclusive religious society and form of governance (caliphate) 
that has distinct boundaries from unbelievers.        
 
III. Violence: Meaning and Category  
 Another term to be clarified in this writing is the term “violence”. As 
with „fundamentalism‟ it is surprisingly complex and difficult to define.  
According Johan Galtung there are three forms of violence; direct, structural, 
and cultural violence. Direct violence includes killing, maiming, sanctions, 
misery, desocialization, repression, expulsion, and so on. This feature of 
violence is easy to recognize, as it is „physical‟, though most definitions of 
contemporary terrorism also stress the „threat‟ of violence. This form of 
„violence‟, according to Galtung, „tends to be institutionalized, repetitive, and 
ritualistic, like a vendetta‟.21 Conversely, Structural violence and cultural 
violence are more complex. The key word for understanding structural violence 
is „exploitation‟. Its simple logic is that „the topdogs get much more out of the 
interaction in the structure than others, the underdogs‟. In other words, there is 
„unequal exchange‟ in interactions and relations between actors. 22 The process 
of exploitation is sustained by two other steps in structural violence. The first 
step is penetration combined with segmentation. The former means that the 
topdogs force the underdogs to speak based on the topdogs‟ interests. The latter 
refers to the topdogs‟ effort to limit the explanation of what really happens to 
the underdog. The second step is marginalisation combined with 
fragmentation. Marginalisation is an exertion to put and maintain the underdog 
on the periphery or outside, while fragmentation is to set the underdogs apart 
from each other.23 
    The final feature of violence, according Johan Galtung, is cultural 
violence.  It refers to any aspect of culture, including religion, ideology, 
language, art, empirical science, and formal science (logic, mathematics), that 
can be utilized as a justification for and legitimation of direct and structural 
violence. As a result, both direct and structural violence look natural and right, 
or „normal‟. 24 For example, as part of culture, religion plays a pivotal role in 
triggering violence because religion as a set of beliefs is easily manipulated by 
leaders to support violence by followers. For example, there are usually strict 
dichotomies between good and evil in which the former is quite often 
associated with God, or as revealed by God to the leader, while the later refers 
to Satan, with which the leader denounces the sins of opponents. Such black 
                                                 
21 Johan Galtung, „Cultural Violence‟, in Journal of Peace Research, vol. 27, no.3, 1990, pp. 291-305, 
p. 292.    
22 Actors may encompass person, districts, nations, or region. Whatever they are, importantly 
they can act and interact each other. Johan Galtung, Peace and Social Structure, Essays in Peace 
Research, vol. III, (Copenhagen, Ejlers, 1978), p. 29-31.   
23 Johan Galtung, „Cultural Violence‟, 1990, p. 293-294.  
24 Johan Galtung, „Cultural Violence‟, 1990, p. 291.  
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and white dichotomies create sharp opposition between „the Chosen One (by 
God) and the Unchosen Ones by God, chosen by Satan‟. Those who are the 
chosen ones will receive eternal salvation and closeness to God in Heaven, 
whereas the unbelievers will are doomed to eternal damnation in hell with 
Satan.. According to Galtung, Heaven and Hell are also said to be felt on earth 
in the form of misery and luxury, which are preparations for Hell/Heaven.25 
This view justifies violence by believers who judge others to be „unchosen‟ and 
unworthy.   
Meanwhile, Mary R Jackman in “Violence and Legitimacy in 
Expropriative Social Relations”, offers a definition of violence based on the 
„injuriousness of actions‟. She argues that violence contains „an action that 
inflicts, threatens, or causes injury‟.  The form of the injuries „may be corporal 
that has consequences such as „pain, laceration, death, functional and 
impairment‟, and are against the „basic need of physical survival, avoidance of 
pain, and preservation of bodily integrity and autonomy‟. It may be 
psychological including „fear, anxiety, anguish, humiliation, or diminished self-
esteem‟, encompassing „the destruction, loss, or defacement of property or the 
loss of earnings‟, or it may be social which includes „stigmatization, exclusion, 
imprisonment, banishment, or expulsion‟.26 Violence „may be corporal, written, 
or verbal‟. Because corporal violence is more easily identified, actors or agents 
of violence often try to use written or verbal means instead. Such ways may 
lead to injurious results either directly, „as in formal edicts or contracts 
stipulating physical harm against an individual or group‟, or indirectly such as 
a „a moral or physical threat‟ against individuals or groups.27 
 By considering these definitions of violence, it can be said that the forms 
it can take are diverse, ranging from direct or physical to symbolic violence, and 
which may be committed in various ways. Related to the assessment of 
religious fundamentalist movements in this essay, what is relevant from 
Galtung‟s conception of violence is that religion has the potential to justify or 
legitimise violence. It does not mean that religion is inherently violent or will 
lead inevitably to violence,. Whether or not religion results in violence depends 
arguably on the leader‟s interpretation of the religion‟s tenets and the 
fanaticism of followers. In other words, religion has the theological teachings 
and symbols to justify terrorist violence.28 Mary R. Jackman argues that the 
psychological and social outcomes of violence, publications defending violence 
and verbal calls to violence have to be taken into account.  
 
                                                 
25 Johan Galtung, „Cultural Violence‟, in Journal of Peace Research, 296-7.  
26 Mary R Jackman, „License to kill: Violence and Legitimacy in Expropriative Social Realtion‟, 
in John T. Jost and Brenda Major, eds., The Psychology of Legitimacy: Emerging Perspectives on 
Ideology, Justice, and Intergroup Relation, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001), pp., 443-
4 
27 Mary R Jackman, „License to kill: Violence and Legitimacy in Expropriative Social Realtion‟,  
28 Mark Juergensmeyer, Terror in The Mind of God: The Global Rise of Religious Violence, (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 2000), p. xii.  
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IV.  Link between Fundamentalism and Violence   
Is there any intrinsic link between religion in general (fundamentalism in 
particular) and violence? To answer this question, it is interesting to note 
Emerson and Hartman‟s observation about the influential work of Mark 
Juergensmeyer, especially his Terror in the Mind of God.29 According to Emerson 
and Hartman Juergensmayer provides a wide range of social approaches to 
understanding the phenomenon of terrorism and violence and their relation to 
fundamentalism.30 First, religion is sometimes hijacked by those who are 
actually not affiliated with a specific religious motive or movement to commit 
violence. In their hands, religion is used to justify the violence committed. In 
other words, not all religiously motivated violence is conducted in the name of 
fundamentalism. Second, not all fundamentalist movements regard violence as 
the best way to achieve their ultimate political objective, whatever it is.31 
 Another answer to the question is that there are two forms of 
fundamentalism, namely „active fundamentalism‟ and „moderate 
fundamentalism‟, so it depends. Active fundamentalism justifies violence as a 
means of making significant social and political change. Moderate 
fundamentalism, though it shares the same literal reading of religious 
scriptures or tenets, does not advocate or utilise violence in pursuit of religious 
ideals. 32 Perhaps a good example of „moderate fundamentalism‟ is the group 
which is operating in Indonesia; HizbutTahrir Indonesia (HTI). Like its 
counterparts in elsewhere, including in Central Asia (Uzbekistan for example),33 
HTI consistently rejected violence as a tool of social and political changes. It 
advocated peaceful methods and ways deliberately because the use of violence 
was absolutely in contradiction to Islamic values and da’wah, or „issuing an 
invitation‟, which is what the Prophet practiced.  
However, some fundamentalist groups condone religious violence. 
There are numerous examples of violence and terrorism committed by 
extremists-fundamentalist groups in the name of religion, evidenced Africa 
(bombings of US embassies in Tanzania and Kenya), Europe (bombings in 
Paris), America (bombing of New York‟s World Trade Center)‟,34 Indonesia 
(bombings in Denpasar Bali), and so on. There are various explanations of the 
phenomenon of international terrorism in the post S-11 era of globalisation. 
Some argue that „theatrical or dramatic forms of violence‟ (borrowing 
Juergensmeyer‟ term) are a part of the political trend. Some social scientists 
                                                 
29 Mark Juergensmeyer, Terror in The Mind of God: The Global Rise of Religious Violence 
30 Michael O. Emerson and David Hartman, „The Rise of Religious Fundamentalism‟, p. 136.  
31 Michael O. Emerson and David Hartman, „The Rise of Religious Fundamentalism, p. 136.  
32 Amirthavenkatraman, „Fundamentalism and Its Stereotypes,‟ 2006.  
33 To know how HT in Uzbekistan is having strong commitment to not using violence, though 
the rule of Uzbekistan suppress its presence, please see Emmanuel Karagiannis and Clark 
Mccauley,‟Hizbut-Tahrir al-Islami: Evaluating the Threat Posed by a Radical Islamic Group 
That Remains Nonviolent,‟ in Terrorism and Political Violence, 18:315–334, 2006 
34 John L. Esposito, „Islamic Fundamentalism in The Middle East and Southwest Asia, UNHCR 
Centre for Documentation and Research, 2001, p. 29.  
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define terrorism and violence as „the use of covert violence by a group for 
political ends.‟35 
In contrast, according to Juergensmeyer, terrorist and violent acts are not 
merely a form of political action, but are a kind of symbolic statement, which 
means they have meaning beyond the immediate target.36 Violent, religious acts 
must be seen as symbolic, ritualistic, or a sacred drama. Moreover, 
Juergensmeyer‟s use of adjectives such as symbolic, dramatic, and theatrical, is 
intended to describe terrorism and violence as performance acts. This implies that 
they are shows designed deliberately to affect various audiences so that the 
populace watching the violence via the news media feels a part of the show or 
drama.  Moreover, the term performance also signifies the idea of the act as 
performative. This concept draws on the language of a philosophy tradition that 
explains that certain forms of speech, such as the vows pledged during a 
marriage ceremony, the nonverbal actions such as raising a white flag as a 
symbol of defeat, or terrorist acts, have a social function as a transformative 
impact. Consequently, according to Juergensmeyer, violence and terrorist acts 
are either performance events, which means they „make a symbolic statement‟ 
orthey are ‘performative acts, insofar as they try to change things‟.37  
 From the above explanation, the question to be asked is why 
fundamentalism advocates violence in some case but not in others. One answer 
is an analysis emphasizing the following two interactions among believers:  
     …first, there is the interaction with those who can confer or withhold  
religious legitimation of behavior. Second, there is the interaction with those 
forces deemed to be hostile or evil.38 
 
It can be concluded from this quote that first, choices between violence 
and non-violence relates to interpretation of doctrines and texts. Within 
religious traditions that do not possess a central authority which, in turn, leads 
to potentially competing authorities, the presence of those who are willing to 
confer the religious license for violence are more easily found., The process of 
interaction may takes place through either of two ways; believer‟s want to 
commit violence comes first and the search for legitimation follows the action. 
Alternatively, the believer searches for religious legitimacy of violence and then 
decides to commit a violent act.  The second pattern of interaction is with 
„others‟.  The believer tries to differentiate him/herself from those „outside‟, in 
                                                 
35 Walter Laqueur, The Age of Terrorism, (Boston: Little, Brown, 1987), p. 72, quoted from Mark 
Juergensmeyer, Terror in The Mind of God, p. 122. 
36 For example, Juergensmeyer‟s remark of the result of his interview with Mahmud 
Abouhalima, who is a convicted perpetrator of the World Trade Center Bombing, is that „the 
bombing of a public building may dramatically indicate to the populace that the government or 
the economic forces behind the building were seen as enemies, to show the world that they 
were targeted as satanic foes.‟  Mark Juergensmeyer, Terror in The Mind of God: The Global Rise of 
Religious Violence,p. 123.    
37 Mark Juergensmeyer, Terror in The Mind of God: The Global Rise of Religious Violence, pp., 123-4.  
38 Michael Barkun, „Religious Violence and the Myth of Fundamentalism‟, p. 64.  
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terms of people whom he/she presumes are non-believers or support a corrupt 
system. In this regard, it is interesting to take into account the theory „dramatic 
denouements‟ proposed by David Bromley in reading the phenomenon of New 
Religious Movement and violence.  He argues that „dramatic denouements’ can 
take place: 
     „when a movement and some segment of the social order reach a juncture at 
which one or both conclude that the requisite conditions for maintaining 
their core identity and collective existence are being subverted and that such 
circumstances are intolerable‟. 39 
 
In addition, dramatic denouements can be terminated by three options. 
First, capitulation, whereone party capitulates to the other. Secondly, exodus, 
where one party retires from the other‟s sphere and, thirdly, battle which is 
whereone party tries to dominate or even destroy the other. The last way is 
more likely related to religiously motivated violence. 40 Bromley‟s second 
pattern of interaction is similar to Galtung‟s concept of cultural violence in 
which religion‟s tenet about the strict division of people chosen by God and 
people chosen by Satan, or between what is good and the truth, and what is bad 
and the devil, is one of the triggers that results direct in structural violence. It is 
possible that fundamentalist groups take this as justification to attack people or 
systems presumed to be wrong, heretical, or backsliding.  
 The second answer to the question is that religiously based violence is 
more likely triggered by the religious-political circumstances rather than 
religion itself. Religious violence can occur if the state does not ensure religious 
diversity or freedom, supporting one religion‟s expression over all others. In 
this situation, unsupported religion is motivated to oppose the government. 
„Whereas government regulation and state-sponsored religion encourage sects 
to fight both church and state, a truly competitive religious market encourages 
religious tolerance and mutual respect if only as a matter of necessity‟. 41 In 
other words, it may be argued that fundamentalist movements may turn violent 
due to changes in „influential external structural factors‟ such as state. If state 
regulation and the broad social and political environment appreciate or at least 
tolerate the existence of fundamentalist movements, they are less likely to 
employ violence in pursuit of their political goals. This is because they may 
suffer a violent political backlash and bear a high social cost such as their literal 
physical extinction. 
 
 
 
                                                 
39 David G. Bromley, „Dramatic Denouements‟, in Bromley and Melton, Cult, Religion, and 
Violence, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), quoted from Michael Barkun, „ 
Religious Violence and the Myth of Fundamentalism‟, p., 65. 
40 Michael Barkun, „Religious Violence and the Myth of Fundamentalism‟, pp., 65-6  
41 Laurence R Iannaccone, „Toward an Economic Theory of “Fundamentalism”, Journal of 
Institutional and Theoretical Economics, Vol. 153, 1997, pp. 100-116, p. 113-4.  
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V. Conclusion 
 The phenomenon of fundamentalism in religion, particularly in Islam, 
and its relationship to violence is a complicated matter. There are neither 
accepted definitions nor explanations about the relationship. Related to 
violence, fundamentalism may be divided into two streams; namely, groups 
that oppose the use of violence, such as acts of terrorism, and, secondly, groups 
that justify violence a means of achieving political objectives. This writing 
identified two factors, one internal the other external, that can trigger a 
fundamentalist group to commit violent acts, The internal factor derives from 
an extremely rigid understanding of religious values, while external factors are 
driven from outside circumstances such as state‟s repressive response to the 
existence of religious fundamentalism. Eventually, it can be argued that if a 
fundamentalism group meets one of both factors, it is almost certain that it is 
going to utilize violence in its motion.   
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